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CREATIVE LAWMAKING: A COMMENT ON LIONEL BENTLY,
COPYRIGHT, TRANSLA TIONS, AND RELATIONS BETWEEN BRITAIN
AND INDIA IN THE NINETEENTHAND EARLY TWENTIETH
CENTURIES
ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS*
Lionel Bently's paper raises several interesting questions pertinent to
the debate over harmonizing (or accommodating) disparities in national
laws. Not only must we consider substantive questions on what the harmonized rule should be, but we must also consider strategic issues: When
should disparate laws be reconciled, and on what basis should it be done?
Following Justice Brandeis's notion of the states as laboratories, 1 should
we be more tolerant of a messy global system in the name of learning about
how various approaches operate in practice? Should we, in short, agree to
disagree so that we can promote not only creativity in science and the arts,
but also in jurisprudence?
Bently's account of the history of the translation right shows us what
is missing when the desire for an orderly system leads to premature lawmaking at the international level: we lose sight of the rich social and political context in which the law is meant to operate. For India at the time the
translation right was debated internationally, that included the abundance
of local languages and the strength of their literatures, the desire to forge an
integrated nation, and the expanding demand for foreign educational materials. It would have been useful to learn how a rule such as the one that
India proposed would have worked; whether it would have led to more
authoritative translations (because the ten-year term would have put authors
under more pressure to translate) and whether it would have generated an
industry in locally sensitive adaptations (because the term would have expired during the useful life of the protected work). Even if India had eventually moved to a full term for the translation right, its experience would be
useful today, as the developing world struggles to absorb the worldwide
2
knowledge base.

* Pauline Newman Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
I. New State lee Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
2. See generally Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development Divide, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006).
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In the lawmaking rush, legal context must also be considered. Take for
example, Jens Gaster's description of the enactment of the database directive. 3 He presented it as the answer to Europe's disparate methods for protecting works of low authorship--in other words, a classic case of
harmonizing law to avoid disparities. For the European Community
("EC"), this directive may be appropriate. However, the EC's attempt to
induce other countries to offer similar protection needs to be considered
carefully: it is important to remember that before the database directive
became law, one of Europe's low-authorship regimes had provoked a
strong competition-law doctrine, capable of dealing with the kinds of problems that are presented when facts are privatized. 4 The EC also enjoys a
court with authority to limit the effect of the directive when its application
threatens to chill more creative production than it encourages. 5 Without this
legal infrastructure, imposing such a regime on other states may be a mistake--even if it tidies up legal disorder. Admittedly, it is probably not necessary to wait for cultural, economic, and legal convergence in every
instance where harmonization is considered; historical studies of situations
like India's, where no disparity was allowed, may enable us to identify the
contexts in which convergence is needed and when it is not.
I believe that the wait-and-see approach is particularly appropriate for
patent law right now, even though harmonization is a persistent topic of
discussion both regionally (in Europe) and internationally (at the World
Intellectual Property Association). 6 Bently's piece demonstrates the difficulties experienced in copyright law in the nineteenth century, during the
growth of secondary markets for published works. For patent law, the
twenty-first century is proving equally fraught with challenges, for the
movement from an industrial to an information age has created many dislocations.
First, the business of doing science is shifting. Universities are entering the system, asking for patents that cover the basic research that characterizes the academic enterprise. Small, knowledge-intensive firms use
3. Jens Gaster, Comments at the Chicago-Kent Symposium: Intellectual Property, Trade and
Development, Accommodating and Reconciling Different National Levels of Protection (Oct. 12-13,
2007).
4. See Joined Cases C-241/91 P & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 1747 (finding a refusal to license copyrights covering facts anticompetitive).
5. See Case C-203/02, British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd., 2004 E.C.R. 110415.
6. See, e.g., Stakeholders Debate Future Policy on Patents, SINGLE MARKET NEWS, July 2006, at
20 (describing the debate over the Community Patent); World Intellectual Prop. Org., Substantive
Patent Law Harmonization, http://www.wipo.int/patent/law/en/harmonization.htm (last visited Jan. 19,
2007).
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patents in new ways, as signals and organizational devices that attract and
manage shifting alliances and collaborative efforts. The new demand for
protection produced by these changes pushes patents upstream and arguably leads to a system where smaller advances qualify for protection. Further, it induces "arms race patenting," where firms acquire patents as
negotiation tools and fodder for counterclaims. As inventive space fills
with patents, transaction costs increase and entry is deterred.
Second, the relationship between science and technology is changing.
In both biotechnology and information sciences, fundamental advances are
also end-products, and thus fully entitled to patent protection. Protection
for core principles-especially in fields where knowledge is cumulativeis, however, worrisome. Exclusive rights over information that was once
available for free creates new risks that technological progress will be
chilled or slowed.
Third, the ratio between patents and marketed products is undergoing
significant alteration. Traditionally, the patent-to-product ratio was close to
one. A pharmaceutical, for example, is typically protected by one patent
(on the compound) and perhaps one or two process patents (on methods of
manufacture and delivery). For products in the information sciences, the
ratio is several orders of magnitude higher-a Blackberry, for example, is
made up of many components, each of which may be separately patented
and thus may require separate licensing arrangements. As a result, there are
many new possibilities for opportunistic behavior (and also many new opportunists, in the form of patent trolls-entities that make money from
enforcing patents, rather than from inventing or manufacturing). Conversely, in the biotech arena, the patent-to-product ratio may be vastly
smaller than one. Patents on gene sequences and protein structures protect
broad-ranging research opportunities, which can yield a multiplicity of
products. There are serious questions whether those who hold such broad
patents have the capacity and incentive to fully exploit their rights or license them efficiently.
Finally, there are changes in the marketplace: intermediation by the
aforementioned trolls, consumer demand for interoperable and multifunctional products, industries that coordinate through standard-setting organizations, and products characterized by network effects and lock in. Where
patents once returned rewards that roughly matched inventors' technical
contributions, these developments create a new class of winners and losers.
Litigation involving a troll can produce exceptional monetary returns because the troll cannot be bought off with cross licenses (since it is not in the
business of inventing or manufacturing). Nor is the troll constrained by
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normal litigation norms-what goes around never comes around because
the troll's lack of participation in the market means it will never be in a
position to defend an infringement suit. In the case of markets that tip because of network effects, standard setting, and such, the reward the patentee receives (and the lack of a reward others receive) is path- (rather than
7
technological superiority-) dependent.
How is law to evolve to cope with all of these challenges? More importantly, where is the facility for change located? Does the desire to harmonize patent law mean that new approaches must now "trickle down"
from the international level to the states? At first blush, the procedural
problems facing India were very different from the situation we now confront. India was enmeshed in a three-regime structure comprising imperial,
national, and international layers (Britain, India, and the Berne Union).
Internationally, it was largely at Britain's mercy; although India had apparent say in policymaking, it is unsurprising that at the end of the day, its
interest in preserving the freedom to translate was sacrificed to other concerns. Now, in theory, every country is directly involved in international
negotiations and thus has the freedom to insure that its own interests are
heard and accounted for.
Theory and practice can, however, be two different things. Developed
nations are adept at finding fora (like the World Trade Organization
("WTO")) where their rich markets give them special advantages. They
also use unilateral and bilateral actions to advance their own interests. 8 As
to multinational negotiations, these can be quite opaque. In a sense, cohesive and well-heeled groups (which is to say rights holders) take the role
once played by Britain. They exercise a similarly strong influence in international fora, but (like Britain) they are not necessarily concerned with
what is best overall. And they are considerably less diffident than Britain
about furthering their own interests.

7. See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, PatentingScience: Protecting the Domain of Accessible Knowledge, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DoMAIN 191 (Lucie

Guibault & P. Bemt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
8. For example, the United States Trade Representative maintains a list of countries that it claims
are violating intellectual property rights. Failure to conform to U.S. demands can result in trade retaliation. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (2000). The United States has also entered into free trade agreements
that impose specific levels of intellectual property protection, sometimes exceeding the standards
required in TRIPS. For example, the U.S. and Australia have agreed to prohibit certain forms of parallel
importation, even though TRIPS takes no position on the issue. See Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]; U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austi., May 18,
2004, T.I.A.S. No. 6422, available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ AustraliaFTA/FinalText/SectionIndex.html.
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To take one example of an interesting idea emanating from India that
may be just as much a loser in the current international scene as the translation right was in Bently's story: the rule barring second-use patents. Currently, the TRIPS Agreement does not specify the size of the inventive step
that determines the right to obtain patent protection.9 In most countriesthe United States is an examplel 0-it is quite low, permitting patentees to
acquire a patent on a new way to use a known product. For pharmaceuticals, this means that a firm can engage in "evergreening" (maintaining
patent protection on a therapeutic compound for multiple patent terms) by
devising new methods for using the compound to treat disease, by creating
new dosage forms, or by incorporating the compound into new dosage
media (such as slow-release capsules or a patch). As India passes out of the
transitional phase envisioned by the TRIPS Agreement,'' it is considering
raising the inventive step so as to bar these "second use patents"12
protection for successive (and rather minor) advances.
This move would have enormous advantages for drug access. Right
now India is busy opening the "mailbox" in which pharmaceutical patent
applications were deposited while awaiting Indian adoption of TRIPScompliant law. The ability to deny patents on these applications-to keep
drugs now available generically out of the patent system-is important to
the health of the population that the Indian generic drug industry supplies.
But India's idea of experimenting by raising the height of the inventive step
could have other ramifications as well. It could serve as a way to trim the
broad patents currently being conferred on fundamental advances. For example, elucidating the structure of small macromolecules is now routine;
were the inventive step heightened, there would be fewer gene and protein
patents, and fewer risks that patentees will be unable to efficiently mine
their claims. 13 Furthermore, if the inventive step were higher, incremental
advances would be patentable less often, which might reduce the patent-toproduct ratio in the information sector.
It would, in short, be helpful to see those affected by social, legal, and
technological developments engage in experimentation. But will the international system permit it? The U.S. pharmaceutical industry is already
9. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1). The inventive step requirement is called "nonobviousness" in American law. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
10. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken
Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and Progress, and What to Do About It (2004).
I1. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65.
12. See. e.g., D.N. Choudhary, Evolution of Patent Laws "Developing Countries' Perspective"
134 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law of
Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 895-97 (2006).
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asking for India to be placed on the Special 301 Priority Watch list, in part
because of India's position on second-use patents. 14 In multinational negotiations, there are, however, some hopeful signs. Thus, Geoffrey Yu's remarks on transparency were quite encouraging. 15 Breaking the hold of
organized user groups is also important. Rosemary Coombe has suggested
ways to introduce new national voices to the table, 16 and both Duncan Matthews and Jamie Love have demonstrated the power of NGOs.17
Most important, the flexibility that the TRIPS Agreement gives to
member states needs to be strengthened. For example, nations experimenting with their laws will often find themselves trying to fit the exceptions
they make in their intellectual property regimes into the notorious threestep tests laid out in the TRIPS Agreement. 18 But as Graeme Dinwoodie
and I have noted elsewhere, 19 these tests are interpreted in ways that may
make creative lawmaking difficult to defend against WTO challenges.
Lacking a normative vision of the role of intellectual property law in the
knowledge economy, dispute settlement panels tend to rely on comparisons
with existing exceptions to intellectual property rights-hardly a recipe for
innovative lawmaking. Further, we have noted that the expansive interpretation that has been given to the technological neutrality principle in patent
law 20 prevents member states from engaging in modest experiments focused on problems in particular sectors of the patent industries.
But even more is required. In future rounds, WTO negotiators need to
operationalize the objectives and principles expressed in the introductory
sections of the TRIPS Agreement: the goal of balancing rights and obligations so that the Agreement can, indeed, work to the mutual advantage of

14. PhRMA Submission to USTR on India for the 2004 Special 301 Report, available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/india/india-phrma30I-04.html.
15. Geoffrey Yu, The Structure and Process of Negotiations at the World Intellectual Property
Organization,82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1445 (2007).
16. Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty: New Dilemma in
International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 98 (1998).
17. Duncan Matthews, The Role of InternationalNGOs in the IntellectualProperty Policy-making
and Norm-setting Activities of Multilateral Institutions, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1369 (2007); James
Love, The Role of Industry and Nongovernmental Organizations, Chicago-Kent College of Law Symposium on Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: Accommodating and Reconciling Different
National Levels of Protection (Oct. 12-13, 2006).
18. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1).
19. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and the
Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 861 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005);
Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, InternationalIntellectual Propery Law and the
Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 431 (2004).
20. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1).

2007]

CREATIVE LA WMA KING

1249

producers and users. 2 1 It would be particularly useful if the requirements
imposed by TRIPS were deemed to be ceilings on international obligations.
This would allow nations that meet TRIPS standards to otherwise experiment with new legal regimes (like bars on second-use patents) without
risking unilateral pressure to conform to the standards viewed as appropriate for radically different economies. In other writing, I have proposed
adding a new section to the TRIPS Agreement that would recognize user
rights. 22 This addition would further clarify the tools that nations could use
to reach the appropriate accommodations between the interests of producers and those who consume or build upon their work.
In the final analysis, Jerry Reichman and Keith Maskus may be right
to suggest a moratorium on further expansions of international intellectual
property protection. 23 A "trickle up" approach, one that internationalizes
law only after disparate regimes have had time to operate, is a better way to
develop a jurisprudence that meets emerging needs. This approach would
permit not only experimentation, but controlled experimentation. In a
world that prizes empirics and evidence-based decision making, the opportunity to watch and see how different approaches work should be highly
valued. In the India/Britain story, we might have learned whether a ten-year
translation right produces more translation than no right or a full term. Today, we could see whether potential inventors are, in fact, deterred if there
are countries that fail to offer second-use patents. Allowing for such experimentation may even be a new source of comparative advantage, for as
nations create law that reflects their own social context, new forms of creativity may begin to flower.
Other experiments are also possible. Thus, regional law may offer alternative inputs into creative lawmaking. As the developments in Europe
show, aggregating the interests of similarly situated economies creates
information about how particular intellectual property law rules operate
across culturally divergent populations. Procedurally, we could also consider the advantages of common law development, 24 or even more informal
sorts of decision making, such as cooperation among the domestic agencies
that administer intellectual property laws or among the judges that imple-

21. Id. arts. 7, 8.
22. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round 11: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
21 (2004).
23. Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF

TECHNOLOGY, supra note 19, at 3, 36-39.
24. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should
Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000).
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ment it.25 And then there is the most radical approach of all: private ordering, as suggested by S6verine Dusollier's paper. 26

25. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information Agencies,
and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1041 (2003).
26. Sverine Dusollier, Sharing Access to Intellectual Property Through Private Ordering, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1391 (2007).

